This paper argues that two ideas -human development and results-based management -have been particularly significant in shaping the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These are unlikely intellectual bedfellows, but by charting the evolution of the MDGs their many influences are demonstrated. However, ideas are only one of the factors shaping the MDGs and the interests of many different actors are revealed in this account. At times the ideas of human development and results-based management were pursued but, when they challenge the interests of powerful groups or nations, their principles are compromised or assiduously avoided.With the wisdom of hindsight the relative coherence of the MDGs seems remarkable, given the processes from which they emerged. Perhaps the 'Hiding Hand' that Albert Hirschman identified 40 years ago guides some elements of global public policy over the long term.
Introduction
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the world's biggest promise -a global agreement to reduce poverty and human deprivation at historically unprecedented rates through collaborative multilateral action. They differ from all other global promises for poverty reduction in their comprehensive nature and the systematic efforts taken to specify, finance, implement, monitor and advocate them. While many different ideas have influenced the 'final' form and content of the MDGs, two specific ideas, human development and results-based management, are identified as having particular significance. However, the ways in which these ideas influenced the evolution of the MDGs has been mediated by many different political interests.
Human development
1 has become a central idea in international development since the early 1990s. It posits that human beings are the ends as well as the means of development, challenging the focus of many economists and policymakers on per capita economic growth. It has encouraged a focus on the poor and poorest and the prioritisation of capability enhancing services (such as food security, education and health). It justifies a multidimensional conceptualisation of human well-being and poverty (Qizilbash, 2006) , although there are heated debates about the exact dimensions of human development (Alkire, 2002; Clark, 2002) . The works of Paul Streeten et al (1981) , Mahbub ul Haq (1995) and Amartya Sen (1999) are seen as seminal to this concept. The UNDP's Human Development Reports have been highly effective in mobilising a constituency promoting human development.
Results-based management (RBM)
2 , or performance management, has been central to efforts to improve public service delivery since the 1980s and was highlighted in Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) influential book Reinventing Government. RBM is a 'strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way government agencies operate with improving performance (achieving better results) as the central orientation… a key component is the process of objectively measuring how well an agency is meeting its stated goals or objectives' (Binnendijk, 2001, p. 3) . This encourages a focus on identifying and continuously monitoring goals, targets and indicators. These should be SMART -stretching, measurable, agreed, realistic and time-limited. This focus on 'measurables' leads to a reduced interest in difficult to measure goals, such as human rights, participation and democracy.
The main objective of the paper is to deepen the understanding of the complex ways in which ideas and interests have interacted to shape the form and content of the MDGs. In its conclusion, the paper argues that the MDGs are surprisingly coherent, given the processes and influences out of which they developed. Perhaps Hirschman's (1967) 'Hiding Hand' guides elements of global public policy opening opportunities for human creativity to improve the human condition in ways that are not anticipated. However, analysing whether the MDGs are a great advance that will reduce poverty or a cul-de-sac is a task reserved for future papers.
The framework for this paper is drawn from several literatures. Taking advantage of Weiss and Carayannis' (2001) work, it uses insights from institutional approaches, expert and activist group frameworks and constructivist writers. In addition, it uses ideas from the emerging field of global public policy.
From an institutional perspective (e.g. Goldstein and Keohane, 1993 ) the paper examines the way in which key actors (organisations and states) shape policy and the policy preferences of other actors. The paper views international relations between states in terms of 'complex interdependence' (Keohane and Milner 1996) . While many actors have some power, the paper views the US, the world's only superpower, as being in a unique position. On occasions it can behave as a G1.
Drawing on expert and activist group approaches (e.g. Haas, 1992; Keck and Sikkink, 1998) , the paper highlights the role of scientific elites (such as poverty measurement experts at the World Bank), epistemic communities (such as the International Coalition on Women's Health) and social movements (such as the women's and environmental movements). The latter have played a crucial role in 'multiply [ing] the channels of access to international debates (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 3) and engaging the media and the public. This ranges from protests at G7/8 meetings and organising parallel events alongside UN conferences to, most recently, becoming formal players at the 2005 World Summit.
The third literature drawn from is 'constructivist' (e.g. Ruggie, 1998) , viewing politics as socially constructed so that actors (leaders, policymakers, organisations, states) can change their values and norms and, consequently, their strategies and policies. This is not to argue that actors do not have material interests. Rather, it is to argue that the interactions between actors can change values so that material conditions and relative power do 'not cast in concrete' the behaviour of any actor (Weiss and Carayannis, 2001, p. 31 ).
Finally, the paper draws on the 'policy process ' literature (e.g. Lindblom, 1959; Clay and Schaffer, 1984) and the emerging field of global public policy (Hulme 2008) . Two insights are drawn from this. First, the policy processes surrounding the formulation, agreement and implementation of the MDGs are viewed as an incremental and ongoing process of negotiation and bargaining with no clear start or clear phases or precise end. While the key actors present policy as an outcome of a linear-rational process based on scientific analysis and weighing up evidence, the real processes they are engaged in are quite different. No leader or agency is 'in control' and '…often serendipity, contingency and chance are important elements in policy change' (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, p. 34) . The second insight relates to the concept of a 'global agora' (Stone, 2006) -the dynamic but poorly defined political space in which global public policies, like the MDGs, are negotiated.
A brief history of the MDGs 3 : phase 1 -antecedents and the UN summits (a) Antecedents
The idea of a dramatic attempt to eradicate or reduce global poverty has antecedents that go back to the mid-twentieth century: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the Development Decade of the 1960s; the many UN summits of the second half of the twentieth century; and, books, reports and associated advocacy exercises on the issue (e.g. Galbraith, 1979; Myrdal, 1970) . With the exception of the UDHR none of these moved much beyond the 'aspirational' stage.
Around 1980, with the arrival of Reagan and Thatcher, the intellectual ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas and the informal shifting of responsibility (and authority) for reducing poverty from the UN to the IFIs; the idea of a concerted multilateral effort at global poverty reduction stalled. Fortunately, at least for the MDGs, this counter-revolution did not stamp out all alternative thinking. By the late 1980s senior figures in the UN system were laying plans for a new generation of global summits.
(b) UN summitry returns
1990 marked a watershed in the evolution of ideas about poverty reduction. Against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War it saw the World Bank's World Development Report 1990, acknowledging the need for economic reform to be accompanied by social policies. Even more significantly the first of the UNDP's Human Development Reports was published. This made the idea of human development accessible to a wider group of professionals and to the serious media and gave social activists a relatively coherent framework from which to argue for policy change. 1990 was also the year of the World Summit for Children in New York, to which the processes leading to the MDGs can be traced back.
The World Summit for Children achieved its identified goals of mobilising public support and political commitment and setting concrete targets to improve the prospects of the world's children. In addition, it re-energised and re-activated the idea that global summits could produce concrete improvements in human welfare. While some summits might be caricatured as glorified talking shops, Jim Grant's leadership and careful planning of the Children's Summit, along with the implementation of its goals, showed that this did not have to be the case.
The next summit, the Earth Summit at Rio in 1992, was a vibrant event raising public awareness of the links between the environment and development. It ensured that environmental sustainability or sustainable development had to be a component of any global strategy. However, it also exposed the North-South divide on how to manage global environmental problems and the USA's reluctance to lead on this issue.
The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna reaffirmed the principles underpinning UN activity and advanced the recognition of the rights of women. But, by its very nature, it steered clear of generating the measurables outputs demanded by results-based management. It provided overarching principles for what would eventually become the MDGs but not 'goals' for action.
The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 had much greater significance for the processes of MDG evolution. The agreements it reached, following heated debates between government officials, professionals, social activists and religious groups, would generate more backroom negotiations and deals than any other MDG item. The ICPD departed radically from the population control and family planning agendas of earlier conferences. Its plan of action focused on reproductive rights for all, with time bound targets for reductions in child, infant and maternal mortality and access to reproductive health services. This worried conservative Islamic countries, the Vatican and conservative Christian groups.
The peak year for UN summitry was 1995 with the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen and the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing six months later. The Social Summit was crucial for the MDGs as a global consensus was reached that poverty reduction was the priority goal for development (UNDP, 1997, p. 108) . It approved the target of eradicating income poverty ($1 a day poverty as it came to be known) by 2015 and reaffirmed the agreements reached at the Children's Summit and the ICPD. Implicitly it drew on the idea of human development and viewed poverty as being multi-dimensional. While the radical Left saw this as a sell out (Saith, 2006) -an acceptance of global capitalism -for the centre Left and centre Right this was a 'consensus'. The agreement at Copenhagen had particular impact and legitimacy as 117 heads of state and government attended it -the largest meeting of 'heads' there had ever been. 4 In the same year the Women's Summit at Beijing -driven by the women's movement -reaffirmed the goals of gender equality and women's empowerment. Many delegates saw the time as ripe for ambitious strategies of empowerment and social transformation (Eyben, 2006) . However, the energy and drive of the conference was not matched by its impact on global goal-setting exercises. Its focus was more on human rights than the measurables that results-based management favoured. The fact that it was the second conference that year also proved disastrous: only two heads of state attended Beijing.
UN summits continued in the latter half of the 1990s but many observers report 'summit fatigue' setting in. The agora for global goal setting was about to shift from these vast and diverse UN jamborees to much smaller formalised meetings centred on Paris -mainly of men from industrialised countries. This was not part of any grand plan. It was just that in Paris there were a group of agencies that needed a set of global goals to help tackle their organisational problems, even if they did not yet know this.
A brief history of the MDGs: Phase 2 -the DAC takes the lead (a) From summits to lists
In the mid-1990s most aid agencies had a big problem. With the Cold War over, their budgets as a share of GDP were declining and the total level of official development assistance (ODA) was in long term decline. For the donor club, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), these were serious problems. Ministers of International Development and the bureaucrats heading aid agencies found themselves increasingly marginalised. The atmosphere at the Chateau de la Muette, for the DAC high level meeting (HLM) of May 1995, was gloomy but no-one had a clear idea of what to do.
The European Union (under the French Presidency) proposed setting up a Groupe de reflexion to review the future of development aid and the role of the DAC. Jan Pronk, the highly-respected Netherlands Minister, supported this but 'the meeting ended with support for the idea but with no implementation plan' (Bradford, 2006, p. 2) . Then serendipity intervened. 5 As Colin Bradford, the US representative, crossed the car park Jan Pronk was pulling out. Bradford waved for him to stop. Through the car window he asked Pronk whether it would be a good idea to push for the launch of the Groupe de reflexion. Pronk agreed so Bradford went back into the Chateau to talk to Jim Michel, chair of the meeting. Michel agreed and three weeks later the Groupe de reflexion was launched.
The Groupe met several times over the next year. Early on it asked DAC staff to draw up a list of UN summit declarations and pull these together into something more coherent. Unexpectedly, this listing became a focus for the Groupe. The drawing up of lists of targets had become a common device in the public services of OECD members, as their governments had adopted RBM.
6 It appealed to the development agencies of the US, UK, Germany and Norway which were already using 'logical frameworks'. It is important to note the quite different cultural context of DAC Groupe meetings compared to UN summits. The DAC debates about what should be listed fell within DAC frames of reference -aid, resource constraints, projects, policies and programmes. Human rights and democracy could be listed as desirable 'qualitative factors', but goals had to be narrower and measurable.
The listing exercise led to discussions amongst Groupe members about what should be included. A particular issue was the initial enthusiasm of the UK and Japanese delegations for a sole focus on income poverty reduction 7 (through economic growth). They argued that a single goal would be better than a multi-dimensional list. Human development ideas strengthened the argument that a broad set of goals was needed for any serious assault on poverty. In the end a compromise was reached: the DAC document would be a listing but it would be headed by 'economic wellbeing' to ensure that the importance of economic growth was clear. This goal would focus on a global goal for income poverty reduction, the 'social development' goals would be subsumed under a single heading and environmental sustainability came third.
In May 1996 the DAC launched Shaping the 21 st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation. The final document was 20 pages long but attention focused on its seven 'International Development Goals' (IDGs) 8 (Appendix 1). The IDGs received broadsheet media attention for a few days. Their main impacts depended on how they filtered back to the OECD countries that had agreed them and the responses of other organisations. Formally, within the OECD they made good progress. They were endorsed at several OECD ministerial meetings and by the G7 in , 1997 (Bradford 2002 . However, in many of the OECD member countries the document did not appear to have much traction. The 'like minded' group of progressive donors (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) took the agreement seriously -indeed, literally. But they were already pursuing IDG type policies and had limited leverage over more powerful donors (USA, Japan, UK and France) and multilateral institutions.
In developing countries the IDGs had little or no recognition or resonance. This was a document produced entirely by rich countries and promises of 'partnership' sounded like standard aid agency rhetoric. Besides, the most powerful agencies that poorer countries had to engage with were the World Bank and IMF, not bilateral donors.
The responses of the major multilaterals varied. For the UN the report and the IDGs had significance (see next section). The IDGs registered in several parts of the World Bank, especially the Poverty Unit of PREM where staff, influenced by Amartya Sen's work and the Human Development Reports, were pushing for the Bank to see poverty as multi-dimensional rather than purely in income/consumption terms 9 . The IDGs barely registered at the IMF.
The responses of NGOs varied depending on their goals and ideological orientation. Broad-based development NGOs could take some satisfaction in an agenda that incorporated 'social development'. However, many of the actions that were within the control of OECD members -increased aid, debt forgiveness, fairer trade -were not part of the targets. For more radical NGOs and the emerging networks of anticapitalist and anti-globalisation groups then the IDGs were just rhetoric -capitalism trying to mask its dependence on the exploitation of labour and the environment.
(b)
The UN and the IDGs
From the UN and its agencies -so heavily involved in organising the summits and conferences from which the IDGs were drawn -there were various responses. It could take satisfaction in DAC advocating so many UN Summit agreements. .
The HDR promotes a human rights approach to human development. DAC's approach is narrower and more akin to basic needs. The UN's primary audiences are its member states (189 countries at that time) and influential interest groups and NGOs. For DAC the target audiences are its member states (20 rich countries) and public opinion in those countries. With overlapping but different memberships, and differing dynamics within those memberships, each organisation faced different constraints on formulating global policy. The twin track process -an OECD list and a UN list -that would lead to the possibility of two different sets of global poverty reduction goals in March 2001 was about to start.
(c) Selling the IDGs in the Rich World: Clare Short and the Utstein Group
The political and public influence of the IDGs, and of UN Summit declarations, might have slowed down in 1997 but for three factors. First came elections and party politics in the UK; second was the coincidence of four Northern European women being ministers for international development at the same time; and third, was the approaching UN Millennium Assembly.
In May 1997 New Labour swept into power in the UK beginning an era when the UK would become a major player in international development. The appointment of Clare Short as the Secretary of State for International Development filled this elevated post with a powerful and 'larger than life' figure. Her personal power was strengthened by her iconic position within New Labour as a left winger committed to making New Labour successful. The political and administrative context around Clare Short and her Department for International Development (DFID) was also very positive. The wider environment was also supportive, as the UK's major NGOs had sensitised the British public to international development and global poverty reduction.
Short came to her job with a list of four things to do quickly: (i) rapidly produce a White Paper; (ii) craft a policy narrative that would mobilise public support for development; (iii) identify DFID's targets for the RBM systems New Labour introduced to the civil service; and (iv) find a way of shifting the government's development focus from UK foreign aid projects to changing the policies (development, trade, military, environmental) of the big players. The IDGs were to have significance for all of these.
She reports a Damascene moment when she first found the IDGs (which she and DFID term the International Development Targets or IDTs):
… Shaping the 21 st Century…drew together the recommendations of the great UN conferences of the 1990's… and suggested that a great advance was possible if we focussed on the systematic reduction of poverty… I decided I would work to make this the framework for our development efforts… (Short, 2004, pp. 53-4) .
She used the IDGs in four main ways. They provided the basis for her first White Paper. She sold the IDGs to her cabinet colleagues, New Labour and the UK public and fed them to the media. They were re-engineered into the first set of targets for DFID's Public Service Agreement 11 with the Treasury. Finally, Short hawked them around the world: 'We believed that the targets [IDGs] could move the world to start to implement the grand declarations it agreed on through the UN…' (Short, 2004, pp. 88-9) . She also 'sold' them to African and Asian heads of state and ministers and was surprised when some of these were not enthusiastic about this 'rich nation' product.
Short did more than any other individual over 1997 and 1998 to promote the IDGs. But, she also had some key allies in the informal Utstein Group of four female international development ministers. They operated very effectively at G7/8, OECD and UN meetings and summits amplifying the policy narrative -the IDGs are the way to rapidly reduce global poverty.
A brief history of the MDGs: Phase 3 -The UN returns to centre stage (a)
Preparing for the Millennium Assembly: 'We the Peoples'
The UN now re-entered the game of global target setting through planning for the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations, to be held at New York in September 2000. The UN's new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was keen to make global poverty reduction central to the UN agenda and avoid being driven along by peacekeeping, security and emergency issues (Traub, 2006, p. 147) .
In May 1999 he identified four main themes for the Millennium Assembly. The second was 'development, including poverty eradication'. The shift that had been occurring in development over the 1990s, and confirmed at Copenhagen, was now being institutionalised. Development was no longer about national development (nationbuilding, economic growth and general improvements in welfare). Rather, it was synonymous with poverty eradication (or reduction).
Countries, international agencies, NGOs, networks and activists energetically began to try and shape the content of the Millennium Assembly and Declaration. Getting into the Declaration would create an unprecedented opportunity -if 'your goal' was in the Declaration then it would automatically be on the agenda at national and international meetings for years to come. For the UN and Kofi Annan the Millennium Assembly had to be successful. The international community must start the new millennium mobilised to take action on global problems beyond security. Closer to home, the UN had to show its value to its members and elicit a commitment from them to support genuine efforts at UN reform. No attention diverting disagreements should distract the media at the Summit.
Waves of formal/official and informal/unofficial meetings were conducted from mid-1999 onwards. The results of these consultations were to inform a pre-Summit report that Annan had promised member states. (Annan, 2000) . Its first section focused on 'freedom from want' and the first point in its conclusion argued that '…we must spare no effort to free our fellow men and women from abject and dehumanising poverty…'. Being a UN publication, this document was very different from the DAC's Shaping the 21 st Century. It was much longer and covered a much wider range of topics. It was also less coherent than the DAC document 12 .
More significantly, for agencies concerned with global poverty reduction, it had a quite different set of poverty reduction goals than the IDGs. A comparison of the goals prioritised in We the Peoples and those in Shaping the 21 st Century reveals a number of goals do not appear or are watered down (the 'losers'). Others appear on Annan's listing but not in the DAC listing (the 'winners'). There are three big losersgender equality and women's empowerment, reproductive health and, more generally the goals for the health sector. Arguably, the 'winners' were economic growth, technology, the setting of goals for the rich countries, the environment and highlighting Africa's problems (see Hulme 2008 for a full discussion).
• Gender equality and women's empowerment: We the Peoples does not explicitly identify these as goals. Gender equality is subsumed under the educational target. A small but powerful set of interests (see below) appear to have persuaded Annan and/or his advisors from including these as explicit goals.
• Reproductive health: Reproductive health goals were omitted from We the Peoples. Despite the 'paradigm shift' being agreed at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), reaffirmed at the Women's Summit and at the 1999 UN General Assembly, it failed to make the document. Effective networking between the Vatican and conservative Islamic countries (Sudan, Libya and Iran) 13 meant that the G77 (the UN's informal association of developing countries with around 130 members) '…was internally split on the issue but opted for a consensus that would not offend its most conservative members' (Crossette, 2004, p. 3 • Africa: In the report Africa is singled out as needing particular attention. This is no surprise, given the continent was now concluding its second 'lost decade' and African leaders were discussing pan-African initiatives to 'kick start' economic growth across the continent.
Two points should be noted from this comparison. First, the goals identified in We the Peoples had less of a human development focus than the IDGs. The capabilities of child, maternal and reproductive health and gender equality were much less evident. Second, although Ruggie (2001, p. 47 ) is an RBM enthusiast, the goals in We the Peoples were less RBM compliant than the IDGs. The need for the UN document to satisfy, or at least not annoy, a broad constituency meant that the application of RBM principles was constrained.
(b) Setting Global Poverty Reduction Goals: A Two Track Process
We the Peoples provided a strong indication of the most progressive agreement that Annan and his advisors thought the Millennium Summit would reach. But apart from keeping the UN's member states on board, Annan needed to find a way of demonstrating that the UN was coordinating its global poverty reduction activities with the other big players -the World Bank, IMF and the OECD's bilateral agencies. This document re-iterated the DAC's 1996 IDGs almost exactly. It re-affirmed the primacy of results-based management thinking: 'The goals are set in precise termsmeasured in numbers to ensure accountability… our institutions are actively using these development goals as a common framework to guide our policies and programmes and to assess our effectiveness' (ibid, pp. 2-3). Most significantly, the goals in BWFA included reproductive rights and reduced child and maternal mortality -human development goals that We the Peoples had omitted.
Beyond its content A Better World for All revealed an important aspect of the global poverty reduction goal setting process -it was a twin track process. The OECD was continuing with its efforts and had support from the IFIs. In parallel the UN was mounting a similar exercise to produce a list from the Millennium Summit.
(c) From We the Peoples to the Millennium Declaration

Over summer 2000 there were frantic negotiations about what should finally go into the Millennium Declaration
16
. The position of the OECD (and virtually all of its members) and of the IFIs was clear -they would like to see the IDGs as the poverty goals in the Declaration. For other parties -UN member states of the 'south', NGOs, social movements, private businesses -preferences varied with their interests and values. Networks of many different types -formally structured and loose coalitions, single issue and multiple issue, conservative and radical -pursued multiple channels (the media, formal meetings with UN civil servants, marches in national capitals, cups of tea with Annan) to advance their viewpoint. Only fragments of the myriad of overt and covert final negotiations are public knowledge 17 . By contrasting the concrete goals identified in We the Peoples and the Millennium Declaration a partial understanding of the processes can be gained.
To reach last minute compromises on contentious issues the UN civil servants involved appear to have used a subtle device. They divided the poverty reduction resolutions in the Declaration into two paragraphs 18 . Paragraph 19 -'We resolve further' -listed goals on which agreement had been reached. These could go forward to the plan of action (the Secretary-General's Road Map) following the Millennium Assembly. Paragraph 20 -'We also resolve' -listed goals that were on the UN agenda but not actionable unless the objections of some member-states 15 OECD statisticians had by now defined a set of indicators that would show progress toward the IDGs. As these progressed they were refined into a hierarchy of goals, targets and indicators. 16 The focus here is on the 'development and poverty eradication' goals and not the entire document. 17 See Hulme (2008) for details of these fragments. 18 Interviews with UN employees confirm that this technique is one that is used to reach agreements. could be overcome in future negotiations. Hulme (2008) provides a full comparison of the changes. Here only highlights are presented:
• Gender equality and women's empowerment -this issue made some progress by being included in paragraph 20. It would not be an implementation priority but it was back on the agenda.
• Infant, child and maternal mortality -the inclusion of these goals was the most dramatic change between We the Peoples and the Millennium Declaration. Even the strong concerns of the Vatican and conservative Islamic states were overcome.
• Major diseases -We the Peoples sole focus on HIV/AIDS was broadened to include 'malaria and other major diseases'. Health professionals were successful in arguing that focussing only on HIV/AIDS would impact negatively on overall health status.
• Benefits of new technology -this goal slipped from the main listing to paragraph 20.
• Goals for rich countries -The goals from We the Peoples are included in the Millennium Declaration (paragraphs 15, 16 and 20). To meet the Summit deadline and avoid confrontation it was agreed that negotiation around these would be deferred until a 'High-level International and Intergovernmental Event on Financing for Development' in 2001.
• Decent work for youth -This goal slipped from the main list to paragraph 20. The omission of a 'decent work for all' goal in the Declaration (and MDGs) is partly explained by ineffective strategy in the 1990s by the ILO and transnational labour organisations (Hulme, 2008) .
The additions, deletions, repositioning of items and compromises discussed above worked, and the Millennium Declaration was unanimously approved on 8th September 2000. The Secretary-General and UN could breathe a sigh of relief. The Millennium Assembly had been a success -the global media had reported in positive terms, UN reform appeared to have been sanctioned and the Declaration contained the materials for a final, authoritative set of global poverty reduction goals.
The next formal stage of the process was for the Secretary-General to draw up a 'road map' showing how the world would achieve global poverty reduction. It was now time to finalise the content of the goals; prepare for the Finance for Development Summit; organise a mechanism for a global plan and for national plans; and develop a mechanism to strengthen public support for global poverty reduction.
A brief history of the MDGs: Phase 4 -from New York to Monterrey (a) Concordance: from Millennium Declaration to Millennium Development Goals
Before the UN could develop a plan for implementing the Millennium Declaration it needed final agreement on what the exact goals and targets were. The Declaration provided a variety of resolutions, scattered around four different paragraphs, but not a precise statement in RBM terms. …my view is that the International Development Goals were a step towards a process which has now culminated with a unique act of endorsement… at the Millennium Summit… my view is that it is a step back to a less universally, less high-level endorsed set of goals (ibid, pp. 42-43).
Bradford countered with a defence of the IDGs, drawn from RBM.
…the advantage of the International Development Goals… is that they are few, they are concrete, they are monitorable, and they are achievable… If necessary we could put together a task force which could attempt to reconcile the Goals… it doesn't take too much intellectual work to figure out how to make them concordant… what we don't want to do is to give on the outside, especially to our parliaments, any sense that we don't have our act pulled together behind something very, very clear and finite and specifically focused (ibid, pp. 44-5).
Subsequently Bradford circulated a hand written note arguing that 'concordance' would be relatively straight forward (Table 1) . (UN, 2001, p. 55) . This authoritative listing was carefully qualified: 'The list of millennium development goals does not undercut in any way agreements on other goals and targets reached at the global conferences of the 1990s'. So, with the publication of a four page annex (see Appendix 2 for an updated version) at the back of a 60 page document, the Millennium Development Goals were finally agreed -or at least almost agreed. There was a note stating that the indicators for Goal 7 (Ensure environmental sustainability) and Goal 8 (Develop a global partnership for development) were 'subject to further refinement'. These were the goals that most affected the rich countries and they wanted some flexibility! It is clear from the final form of the MDGs that the IDGs, as presented in A Better World for All (BWFA, 2000) , were taken as the primary document. Points from the Millennium Declaration were subsequently negotiated into the IDGs and an objectionable IDG goal was removed. The exact reasons for the final negotiations reaching this position are not known, but there are clear logical grounds relating to the main arguments of this paper:
• The IDGs were coherent from a human development perspective. The majority were about capability enhancement and the first and last referred to essential 'means' for achieving human development. They were presentable. The goals in the Declaration lacked such coherence.
• The IDGs were already structured in RBM format -a short, clear list of measurables.
• The most powerful forces in these negotiations, both technically (the IMF and World Bank) and politically (the OECD's members) preferred the IDGs.
Nevertheless, the negotiations had substance and there were winners and losers from an IDG perspective. The biggest loser was reproductive health. It was an explicit goal in the IDGs, and central to human development, but the UN could not entertain this because of the objections of a small part of its membership (see earlier). The compromise that was reached (an advance on the Millennium Declaration) was that 'improved maternal health' could remain on the list. By contrast, there were gains for the gender equality and women's empowerment goal. It remained an explicit goal and its indicators were now extended into economic life and politics.
Other goals on the Millennium Declaration list were demoted for reasons derived from RBM principles. The AIDS orphans goal was converted into an MDG indicator for halting the spread of HIV/AIDS. Similarly, the Declaration's 'safe drinking water' goal was demoted to MDG indicator status. The goal of improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers was downgraded to an MDG target.
The Millennium Declaration did have one major impact on the IDG listing: the addition of Goal 8: a global partnership for development. The final MDG list included 7 targets and 17 indicators for Goal 8. Developing countries were not going to accept a set of goals that applied only to them. There had to be a goal indicating what the rich world would contribute to global poverty reduction. However, there was a qualitative difference between Goals 1 to 7 and Goal 8. While Goals 1 to 7 were time specific there were no concrete dates set for any goal 8 indicators and most of the indicators lacked a quantitative target (Fukuda-Parr, 2006) . This reflected the power relations of the situation -the more powerful members of the OECD were prepared to agree the directions they should move in but they were not prepared to set quantitative targets or agree dates for achievement. They were too smart (and too powerful) to agree to the SMART goals demanded by RBM.
In his first Millennium Summit follow-up report (the Road Map) of 6 September 2001 Annan was able to unveil the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Most UN members subsequently started to refer to these goals and many used them as part of their policy and planning processes. The main exceptions to this were the US 19 and India.
(b) From the Road Map to Monterrey
Over the year following the Millennium Summit, prospects for a concerted push on global poverty reduction weakened. In part this was inevitable: the Millennium fever that had fuelled progress was over. More significant was the change of President in the US. Power now rested with a Republican President guided by a small group of neo-conservative advisors. Bush had hardly any foreign policy experience and neither he nor his advisors had been part of the UN conferences or IDG and MDG process. They were very suspicious of the UN and foreign aid. This was highly inauspicious for the approaching UN Finance for Development (FFD) Conference, now delayed until March 2002. At the FFD it was expected that UN members, and particularly rich countries, would make pledges to raise the level of resources available to achieve the MDGs. It seemed likely that Bush would not attend the FFD Summit and possible that the USA would detach itself from the MDG process. Two sets of events helped change this -neither was planned.
The 9/11 attacks had profound effects on the USA and the world. Perhaps surprisingly, their short term impact on the progress of the MDGs was positive. In its haste to respond to this appalling event the Bush administration thought a little more than it had previously about 'soft power' approaches to foreign policy. It showed more interest in the role of US foreign aid as an adjunct to the 'war on terror'.
Second was that the Finance for Development meeting was in Monterrey and the Mexican President, Vicente Fox, was convenor. Bush had already declared that Mexico was the US's most important foreign partner and talked about his close links with Fox. This put pressure on him to accept the invitation to Monterrey from his friend. As discussed in Hulme (2008) other factors (Bono, Christian conservatives, Condoleeza Rice outmanoeuvring Treasury Secretary O'Neill) also encouraged Bush to attend -and once there he would have to show generosity. So, while the commitments made at Monterrey were well below the levels talked about in 2000, and many rich countries had caveats around their aid, trade and debt reforms, overall the FFD was a success. The MDGs were informally approved there (even if not formally ratified) and Bush promised that the USA would be part of the project for global poverty reduction that the MDGs represented. The MDGs were now ready for implementation.
Human development, results-based management and the MDGs
Human development and results-based management are strange bedfellows coming out of two very different intellectual traditions. Yet, as revealed in earlier sections, both played leading ideational roles in the complex and sprawling processes that produced the MDGs. Their forms of influence differed greatly, however. RBM was applied to the MDGs in a very direct fashion. At times goals, targets and indicators were screened for how 'SMART' they were and judgements made on RBM principles impacted directly on MDG form and content. Human development had a much more diffuse influence. The idea contributed, consciously and unconsciously, to the thinking of many of those involved in the processes leading to the MDGs. But, they were not applied directly 20 .
While the idea of human development provided general support for UN conferences and associated declarations it promoted two specific intellectual components that were to underpin the MDGs. First, it advanced the case that development strategies needed to directly pursue the goals of development, and not just the means. Human development provided an overarching conceptual framework for arguing that education and health improvements and gender equality were not only good in their own right, but were essential components for the pursuit of a dynamic vision of development. In crude terms, five and a half of the eight MDGs are about enhancing human capabilities.
Secondly, when the convenors of the Social Summit, the DAC and the UN drew up lists of goals, they could explicitly or implicitly argue that a list was needed as development and poverty reduction were multi-dimensional. Lists of goals were not mere 'shopping lists', reflecting a failure to analyse problems and select priorities (a criticism that had partly undermined 'basic needs' in the 1980s). Rather, a list of multiple goals was essential for any serious development effort based on rigorous thinking.
While the processes behind the placing of items on such lists involved complex interactions of ideas, empirical evidence, interests and values, human development provided a well-reasoned case for multi-dimensional lists. There was a common sense dimension to such a case but, in the background, were the works of Amartya Sen melding economics with philosophy to argue for the promotion of capabilities and freedoms. His name, along with others, could be cited in an iconic fashion to show that a deep theoretical resource lay behind such lists 21 . This enhanced the legitimacy of the IDG and MDG exercises and added to their argumentative strength.
But, ideas are only part of the story. Interests moderated the influence of human development on the MDGs. At the DAC, delegates realised that a multi-dimensional list made it easier to enlist the support of issue-based NGOs. Having educational, gender, health, HIV/AIDS and environmental goals meant that specialist NGOschildren, gender, HIV/AIDS, family planning, water, and conservation -would find one of their organisational goals on the list. So, having a multi-dimensional list also had political advantages. On a more negative note, the human development arguments for reproductive health were challenged by the concerns of the Vatican and conservative Islamic states and the reproductive health goal disappeared during the negotiations in 2001 that finalised the MDGs.
The ideational adjunct to human development was results-based management. In the 1990s RBM was on the ascendant in Business and Management Schools and in the pronouncements of politicians and senior public servants, especially in the rich world. Its common sense nature and linearity added to its attraction -set targets, monitor achievement and reward staff on the basis of performance. It was adopted across the public sector in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the UK and USA 22 and in the systems of many development agencies (e.g. CIDA, DFID, GTZ, NORAD, UNICEF and USAID). For the aid-financed programmes of the DAC and UN it was particularly attractive. The widely reported underperformance of aid in earlier years would not occur in the future as RBM methods would ensure high levels of performance.
RBM and particularly its tenet of SMART measures (stretching, measurable, agreed, realistic and time-limited) influenced the MDGs in three main ways. First, it determined the structure of the MDGs and explains why they are a nested hierarchy of goals, targets and indicators focused on time-bound policy 'outcomes'. Second, it shaped the specification of goals. While determining exactly what is 'stretching' but also 'realistic' is not an exact science one sees this tenet in operation with the $1 a day poverty target. At Copenhagen this was set as 'eradicating' extreme poverty by 2015. When the DAC applied its RBM thinking to this target it was reduced to the more achievable 'halve the proportion' of the extreme poor by 2015
23
. Finally, the idea of RBM meant that the MDGs avoided potentially difficult to measure goals like human rights and participation. These could be placed in the introductions and conclusions of documents such as Shaping the 21 st Century and the Road Map, but not in the lists that are to guide action. As a result the variety of human development that impacted on the MDGs was more akin to basic needs than human rights. 21 This was enhanced when he won the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics. 22 A growing literature in the US and UK is critical of the impacts of RBM and performance management on public service delivery (see Radin, 2006) . 23 Though do note that critics of the MDGs argue that this meant that targets were no longer as stretching as they should have been.
As discussed earlier, political interests moderated the full application of RBM. This is most obvious for Goal 8. The idea of RBM was rigorously pursued for goals 1 to 6 and partially applied to Goal 7. However, it was systematically avoided for Goal 8. While the like-minded group might be willing to agree to 0.7% of GDP to be provided in aid by 2015 (they had already achieved this) the US and Japan were certainly not going to agree to that. Interests took precedence over ideas.
Conclusions: MDG coherence and the 'hiding hand'
The MDGs are the world's biggest promise -committing 189 states and all of the world's main multilateral agencies to an unprecedented effort to reduce multidimensional poverty through a global partnership. Many ideas have influenced their content and form. This paper has argued that two ideas were particularly important: human development and results-based management.
But, the form and content of the MDGs was not argued out in a global university seminar room. The promotion and obstruction of specific points, and the ways in which they were interpreted, depended on the values and interests of key actors at key events and over longer periods of time. Nation states and multilateral organisations often dominated formal discussions, but behind their deliberations were the actions of large numbers of networks (of organisations and individuals) forming shifting and often poorly-defined coalitions and alliances. The ambivalence of the USA to the MDG-evolutionary process meant that less powerful states, most obviously the UK, took on global leadership roles. The concerns of religious conservatives (Roman Catholic, Evangelical Christians and Islamic) about reproductive issues meant that such groups played a significant role in MDG processes.
Core components of human development -gender equality, child survival, maternal survival and others -were argued on and off the evolving lists of UN conference declarations, the IDGs, the Millennium Declaration and the Road Map's MDGs. In a similar fashion, the principles of RBM were applied in different ways to different MDG goals: specific, time-bound goals were fine for poor countries but for rich countries they were assiduously avoided.
With the wisdom of hindsight, the coherence of the MDGs -economic well-being, social development, environmental sustainability and a global partnership -seems remarkable given the processes from which they emerged. Perhaps a 'hiding hand', guides not only some development projects but also elements of global public policy over the long term. As Hirschman writes (1967, pp. 13-5):
…since we necessarily underestimate our creativity, it is desirable that we underestimate to a roughly similar extent the difficulties of the tasks we face so as to be tricked by these two offsetting underestimates into undertaking tasks that we can, but otherwise would not dare, tackle…our more lofty achievements, such as economic, social, or political progress, could have come about by stumbling rather than through careful planning, rational behaviour, and the courageous taking up of a clearly perceived challenge.
Whether the creativity unleashed by the MDGs will deliver improved lives for the world's poorest people remains to be seen. 
